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Abstract
This paper aims to estimate empirically the e±ciency of a Swiss
telemedicine service introduced in 2003. We used claims' data gathered
by a major Swiss health insurer, over a period of six years and involving
160 000 insured adults.
In Switzerland, health insurance is mandatory, but everyone has the
option of choosing between a managed care plan and a fee-for-service
plan. The present paper focuses on a conventional fee-for-service plan
including a mandatory access to a telemedicine service; the insured are
obliged to phone this medical call centre prior to visiting a physician.
This type of plan generates much lower average health expenditures
than a conventional insurance plan. Reasons for this may include se-
lection, incentive e®ects or simply e±ciency.
In our sample, about 90% of the di®erence in health expenditure
can be explained by selection and incentive e®ects. The remaining 10%
of savings due to the e±ciency of the telemedicine service amount to
about SFr 150 per year per insured, of which approx. 60% is saved by
the insurer and 40% by the insured. While the plan is cost-e®ective,
the big winners are the insured who not only save monetary and non-
monetary costs, but also bene¯t from reduced premiums.
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1 Introduction
In 2003 a Swiss health insurer (KPT) launched a new plan whereby the
insured, in exchange for a premium rebate, would be obliged to seek advice
from a telemedicine service prior to consulting a physician. This plan is
known as the \Integriertes Stufenmodell (WIN) LK1", hereafter the \Win-
win"plan. The raw data show that the health expenditure of enrolees to
this new plan is half that of those who remained with their original plan.
To what extent then are these spending di®erences due to the e±ciency of
the Winwin plan?
To answer this question, three methods could be used. The ¯rst concerns
checking all bills and phone calls with the aim of inferring what would have
occurred if the insured had not phoned the telemedicine service. Obviously
this is almost impossible to apply ex-post. To the question \Would you
have gone to the physician if telemedicine was not available?", any answer
given by enrolees will almost certainly be in°uenced by the fact that they
know whether the visit to the physician was helpful or not. This analysis
has to rely on a powerful model capable of predicting how each enrolee will
react. Regrettably, such an approach is far beyond the scope of the present
research.
The second method involves running a new RAND experiment and ran-
domly selecting speci¯c enrolee samples. This is far beyond the budget of
the present research.
The third method, which we use here, takes relatively aggregate data and
constructs a robust model that can distinguish to what extent the di®erences
in spending are due to selection and to incentives; any remaining di®erences
not explained by these two nuisance factors are attributed to the e±ciency
e®ect.
The literature on telemedicine deals mainly with new technology, medicine
and economic evaluation. The economic literature on health insurance e±-
ciency focuses mainly on the e±ciency of managed care plans, such as HMOs.
But the problem and therefore the methodology are exactly the same than
in our own research. Below is a brief summary of the main ¯ndings from
existing research.
The RAND Experiment included a section which dealt with HMOs and
may be considered as a reference. Newhouse et al. (1996) analysed and
compared health expenditure in an HMO plan and in a fee-for-service plan.
The spending di®erences between the two plans is attributed to varying
hospitalisation rates; the HMO plan spent more on preventive visits, but
decreased the hospitalisation rate by about 40%. Newhouse et al. attributeDoes telemedicine decrease costs or only attract good risks ? 3
this to di®erences in patient treatment. However, no di®erence was found
in outpatient expenditures. Buchanan et al. (1996) also adopted the second
method and used experimental data to estimate cost reductions in the US
Medicaid system by comparing a sta® HMO to a fee-for-service plan. The
savings were linked to the probability of using care; once health expenditures
were positive, the amount of services received was the same.
Other studies (including ours) used the third method to estimate e±-
ciency. For example, Shin and Moon (2007) used the Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey to estimate the cost containment performance of HMO plans.
They found little evidence of selection in favour of the HMO plan and no
evidence of signi¯cant cost-savings, even after they controlled for potential
selection bias. Lehmann and Zweifel (2005) used panel data from a Swiss
insurer to estimate the e±ciency of an HMO plan. They found that the
plan lowered average health expenditure by about 62% compared to the
conventional fee-for-service plan. They also concluded that the e±ciency
gain accounted for two-thirds of this cost decrease, and selection for a mere
one third. Finally, Deb et al. (2006) used simultaneous equations apply-
ing econometric simulation techniques to estimate the treatment e®ects of
managed care plans on the utilization of health care services, while con-
trolling for the endogeneity of the insurance plan. They found evidence of
self-selection in a managed care plan and estimated that the number of vis-
its to a physician or an emergency room were signi¯cantly higher when an
individual was enrolled in an HMO plan.
In the Winwin plan, the insured must ¯rst contact a medical call centre
before visiting a physician. Physicians working at the call centre advise on
the timing and the type of medical care needed. They provide callers with
a given timeframe during which the patient can visit a physician. However,
should this period elapse and the patient still requires a further consultation
with a physician, he/she is obliged to contact the telemedicine centre again.
In selected cases, the physician can prescribe drugs and/or propose self-
treatment.
This procedure is expected to yield two main bene¯ts: preventing futile
physician visits and o®ering better guidance and timing in relation to health
care use. The main consequences are the delivery of fewer primary health
care consultations, and a reduction in the attendant investigation and treat-
ment costs. Given that these visits are usually inexpensive but frequent,
the amount of e±ciency gain is presumed to be limited. Individual histories
may well include persons, who visit a doctor after the advice and are saved
by a costly treatment, but would have died overnight if they did not. This
is certainly a social gain, but this is a cost in monetary terms. This researchDoes telemedicine decrease costs or only attract good risks ? 4
covers only monetary costs and therefore foresees some bene¯ts of the plan.
The insured generally regard this mandatory call as a burden, or as a loss
in freedom. The health insurer therefore o®ers premium rebates to anyone
joining the plan. For individuals in good health who do not intend to consult
a physician in the coming year, this reduced premium is considered as a free
gift. In contrast, patients with a diagnosed chronic disease are aware that
they will need health care anyway, so a mandatory prior phone call simply
constitutes a burden. This raises the suspicion that people who opt for the
Winwin plan are on average in better health than those who do not.
The structure of our paper is as follows: We present brie°y the general
context in which the plan was launched (2), the data set (3), the method
(4), the results (5) and as a conclusion discuss the impact of our ¯ndings for
the Swiss health insurance sector today (6).
2 Health insurance and telemedicine in Switzer-
land
Since 1996, the Federal Law on Health Insurance (LAMal) has made health
insurance compulsory for all individuals who are resident in Switzerland.
They can choose between several health insurers, each of which is legally
obliged to o®er a broad basic package of health care services, procedures
and treatments. These cover sickness, accidents and maternity health care.
Accident coverage is mandatory but since most employees are already cov-
ered through their employers, they are free to omit it from their health
insurance package.
Premiums vary across insurance funds, but °at rates apply to a given
plan and to a given deductible. In particular, no discrimination based upon
age, gender or health status is allowed. A risk-adjustment scheme between
insurance funds reduces the incentives to select risks. However, the present
risk-adjustment Swiss formula is based exclusively on age, gender and re-
gion. Moreover, premium reductions for a higher deductible are limited by
law in order to curb risk selection. Finally, the state subsidises health in-
surance premiums of those in the low-income bracket, implementing a form
of redistribution between income levels.
Private not-for-pro¯t insurance ¯rms o®er a variety of contracts includ-
ing the conventional fee-for-service plan as well as a range of managed care
plans. Though the conventional fee-for-service insurance plan is still the
most common (90% of the population in 2005), the popularity of the man-
aged care plan has grown over time.Does telemedicine decrease costs or only attract good risks ? 5
There are two types of managed care plan: the ¯rst involves a reduced
choice of physicians (HMOs and gatekeeper plans), while the second places
no restrictions on the choice of physician but makes a phone call to a
telemedicine service mandatory prior to any medical visit (except emer-
gency and preventive care). Managed care plans and their premiums must
be approved by the state health regulator.
In addition, all insurance contracts include a mandatory deductible of
SFr 300 1 on yearly expenditures for adults, a co-payment rate of 10% once
the deductible level has been reached and a cap on yearly payments equal
to SFr 700 for adults and SFr 350 for children in addition to the deductible.
Furthermore, di®erent deductible levels, set by law, can be o®ered by in-
surance companies in return for a reduced premium, but the minimum
deductible of SFr 300 always remains for adults. Currently, optional de-
ductibles are equal to SFr 500, 1 000, 1 500, 2 000 or 2 500 for adults and
SFr 100, 200, 300, 400, 500 or 600 for children. Note that maternity is
still treated as a sickness in Switzerland, yet no co-payment or deductible is
applied to standard maternity expenditures.
We compare two di®erent insurance plans: a conventional fee-for-service
insurance plan and a \light"version of the managed care plan, which obliges
the insured to contact a telemedicine service prior to any medical visit. The
health care services and treatments covered, the deductible proposed and
the co-payment scheme are the same for both plans. The only di®erences
between the two are the mandatory use of the telemedicine service and
the reduced premium rates for the managed care plan 2. Therefore, if the
sampled insured in each plan were comparable, we could directly estimate
the e±ciency e®ect of the use of a telemedicine service as the di®erence in
mean expenditures.
3 Description of the data set
We use administrative data from KPT, one of the largest health insurers
in Switzerland, which proposes both the regular fee-for-service plan and
the plan featuring a telemedicine service. KPT has o®ered its \Winwin
plan"since 2003. In 2001 and 2002, individuals could choose between the
general insurance plan (OKP plan) and another managed care plan (GP -
11 Swiss franc equals approximately 0.61 Euros or $0.90
2The premium rebate varies between 5% and 20% depending on the insurer and the
type of plan. In 2007, the average annual premium in Switzerland for the basic deductible
was Sfr 3 756.Does telemedicine decrease costs or only attract good risks ? 6
Figure 1: Number of insured per plan from 2003 to 2006
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general practitioner); the latter was discontinued in 2003. Only a small share
of the total insured chose the Winwin plan when it was launched (4.2% in
2003). However, it should be noted that this share has increased over time
(13% in 2006). Figure 1 shows the movement across plans o®ered by KPT
between 2003 and 2006 (for insured in the OKP plan in 2001 and 2002 only).
It is clear from the ¯gure that very few went back to the OKP plan after
enrolling in the Winwin plan.
For each individual we observe the amount of yearly health care expen-
diture for the 2001-2006 period as known by KPT. We retain only those
individuals who stayed with KPT during the entire observation period and
continued to reside in the same canton. The data set contains information
on 161 462 insured adults, and covers a period of six years (2001 to 2006),
i.e. a total of 968 772 observations. We also examined information on 37 782
children (0 to 18 years old), or 226 692 observations for the same six-year
period. It is reasonable to assume that this administrative data set is highly
reliable since most of the health care invoices are sent to the insurer; inpa-
tient and medication invoices are directly sent and paid by the insurer, whileDoes telemedicine decrease costs or only attract good risks ? 7
the insured must ¯rst settle any outpatient bills before forwarding them to
the insurer for reimbursement. As usual, no \pure"health status variables
are available, with the exception of observed spending.
Speci¯cally, we observe the following variables:
² year of birth
² gender (1 represents men)
² insurance choice: insurance plan and deductible
² annual health care expenditures: outpatient, inpatient and medication
separately
² type of expenditures: sickness, accident or maternity
² canton of residence
² subsidised premium (yes/no)
Since the use of telemedical services is assumed to have little impact on
accidents and maternity care, we limited our examination to sickness-related
data. Individuals who had selected the GP (general practitioner) managed
care plan may have a di®erent background and will be estimated separately.
Similarly, given that the level of health expenditures, the deductible and the
age e®ect on spending vary considerably between children and adults, we
shall estimate a separate model for children.
Table 1: Health expenditures per year and per plan (Sfr)
Total expenditures 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
OKP 2 102 2 302 2 486 2 983 3 163 3 430
Plan Winwin - - 1 289 1 654 1 539 1 648
All 2 102 2 302 2 435 2 925 3 037 3 198
Expenditures>0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
OKP 79.85% 80.65% 80.71% 80.51% 81.72% 81.84%
Plan Winwin - - 68.68% 69.97% 67.79% 70.11%
All 79.85% 80.65% 80.20% 81.01% 80.64% 80.31%
Table 1 summarises the di®erences in average spending and the share of
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in the Winwin plan has about half of the mean expenditure compared to an
OKP plan enrolee. The proportion of positive expenditures is also lower in
the Winwin plan.
4 Empirical problematic
This substantial di®erence in spending may be explained by three e®ects:
Selection e®ect Individuals in good health see the premium rebate as a
gift, and therefore are more likely to select the Winwin plan, thus
leading to lower average health expenditures compared to the OKP
plan. This e®ect is due to self-selection rather than risk selection, as
the insurer does not undertake any selection
Incentive e®ect There is no direct incentive e®ect since the coverage is ex-
actly the same. However, as we shall see, the self-selected deductibles
are higher for those who joined the Winwin plan, changing the average
coverage in terms of co-payment. This leads to di®erences in the in-
centive e®ects which can go some way to explaining the varying health
expenditure levels between the two plans
E±ciency e®ect Given that the telemedicine service provides medical ad-
vice, it may therefore prevent a futile physician visit or provide better
guidance and timing in relation to health care use.
As we shall show, there is strong evidence of both selection and incentive
e®ects in our data. To be able to evaluate the e±ciency e®ect correctly,
we need to control for the other two e®ects. Incentive e®ects are due to
di®erences in the distribution of deductibles, and may easily be taken care
of, since deductibles are observed variables. Other observed variables such
as age and gender and deductibles may be used as proxies for the selection
e®ect, but they proved to be bad proxies. Consequently, we constructed a
model to control for unobserved selection e®ects.
4.1 Strong evidence of selection e®ects
Selection e®ects and selection bias are a frequent focus in the literature.
Some authors found evidence of selection e®ects (Cutler and Zeckhauser
(2000), Culter and Reber (1998), Cameron et al. (1988)), while others
found none, e.g. Jones et al. (2002), Cardon and Hendel (2001) or Downd
et al. (1991). However, research using Swiss data typically found evidenceDoes telemedicine decrease costs or only attract good risks ? 9
of selection e®ects (Gardiol et al. (2005b), Lehmann and Zweifel (2005),
Werblow and Felder (2003), Schellhorn (2001)).
As already mentioned, we suspect that self-selection e®ects are at play
here. In fact, the evidence is quite clear. Table 2 shows that younger
individuals and relatively more men chose the Winwin plan compared to
the OKP plan.
Table 2: Age and gender (1=men) per year and per plan
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Age
OKP 48.13 49.14 50.29 51.30 52.51 53.76
Winwin - - 48.61 49.47 48.79 49.61
Gender
OKP 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
Winwin - - 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.52
Moreover, if we compute the mean expenditures in 2002, depending on
the future choice of plan in 2003, we obtain the results shown in table 3
(similar results are obtained for 2004 to 2006):
Table 3: Average health expenditure in 2002 according to choice of health
insurance plan for 2003 (Sfr)
Average health expenditure in 2002
Deductible in 2002 230 400 600 1 200 1 500
Future plan
in 2003
OKP 2 703 2 116 1 634 892 766
Winwin 1 452 1 173 611 477 392
People who will self-select the Winwin plan in the future already spend
approximately half of what individuals who remain with the OKP plan, even
after controlling for deductible di®erences. This may not be explained by
e±ciency and therefore provides clear evidence of a strong selection e®ect
linked to health status or at least to health consumption behaviour.
4.2 Evidence of incentive e®ects
Table 4 presents the mean deductible per year and per plan. The deductible
is a discrete variable since only six di®erent levels are set by law. An averageDoes telemedicine decrease costs or only attract good risks ? 10
deductible does not represent the real value of a deductible but rather a
¯ctional number which provides information on the average coverage chosen
by the insured. As we already know, self-selection does occur: the healthier
opt for the Winwin plan and the insured in general choose their deductible
level based on their health status (see Gardiol and al. (2005a)). Therefore,
we were not surprised to observe a higher average deductible in the Winwin
plan compared to the OKP plan.
Table 4: Average deductible chosen by the insured by year and by plan (Sfr)
2003 2004 2005 2006
Average
deductible
OKP 468 528 593 605
Winwin 748 829 1 134 1 179
Since the distribution of deductibles is di®erent for the Winwin and the
OKP plan, regardless of the year of observation, Winwin plan enrolees face
stronger monetary incentives than those in the traditional plan. Although
merely an indirect e®ect of this plan, it still means that Winwin enrolees
spend less on health care (Newhouse (1996), Gardiol et al (2005b), Cardon
and Hendel (2001)). Both this and the selection e®ect must be controlled
for.
5 Estimation of the e±ciency e®ect
5.1 Model
We estimate a two-step model for all the years of observations. The ¯rst step
involves a logistic model for health care use, while the second is concerned
with a linear regression for positive spending. The expected e±ciency gains
are additive by nature, which means that they mainly re°ect saved physi-
cians visits but are not a percentage of spending. We therefore chose to es-
timate a linear over the usual log-linear model to obtain the additive rather
than the multiplicative e±ciency e®ect. We control for all other sources of
explanation of the correlation between health expenditures and the choice
of the insurance plan, age, gender, time in°ation, deductibles, subsidised
premiums and the cantonal dummies to control for the regional e®ects (dif-
ferences in tari®s, behaviours, ...). Time variables are introduced in the
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of deductibles was changed by law twice during the period concerned 3, we
decided to classify them into four groups in order to avoid some collinearity
between the time and deductible dummies:
² reference group: basic levels of deductibles (Sfr 230, 300)
² ded low: low level of deductibles (Sfr 400, 500, 600)
² ded mid: middle level of deductibles (Sfr 1 000, 1 200)
² ded high: high level of deductibles (Sfr 1 500, 2 500)
The selection e®ect is not well explained by any of the available vari-
ables. However, we were fortunate to observe at least two years of spending
behaviour prior to selection. During this ¯rst period, the di®erence in ex-
penditures (corrected for the deductible levels) merely re°ects the selection
e®ect. After self-selection, the di®erence in expenditures (corrected for the
deductible levels) re°ects the sum of the selection and e±ciency e®ects. The
discrepancy between the di®erences in spending behaviour during the two
periods is therefore the e±ciency e®ect.
The dummy variable \select"takes the value 0 for an individual who
never chose the Winwin plan and the value 1 for an individual who chose to
enrol with the Winwin plan for at least one year.
The dummy variable \win"takes the value of 0 if the individual is not
in the Winwin plan during the year of observation, and the value of 1 if the
individual is in the Winwin plan 4.
To illustrate the construction of these two variables, let us consider three
examples:
1. Ms Poorly is 65-years' old and frequently visits her physician. She did
not enrol with the Winwin plan as she preferred to remain with the
traditional OKP plan.
2. Ms Happy is 40-years' old and she immediately chose the Winwin plan
in 2003 to bene¯t from a premium rebate. Since she was happy with
3The basic deductible changed from SFr 230 to 300 on 1st January 2004. In addition
all deductible levels changed from SFr 300, 400, 600, 1 200 and 1 500 to SFr 300, 500,
1 000, 1 500, 2 500 on 1st January 2005.
4Note that there is no punishment for non-compliance in the Winwin plan. In this
study, individuals who went to a physician without calling the telemedicine centre ¯rst
are nevertheless kept in the Winwin sub-sample although they do not bene¯t from the
telemedicine service.Does telemedicine decrease costs or only attract good risks ? 12
this model, she stayed in the Winwin plan for the entire observation
period.
3. Mr Stressed is 30-years' old and very busy. He missed the opportunity
to choose the Winwin plan in 2003 but chose it in 2004. Since he
always forgot to call the telemedicine centre before visiting a physician,
he returned to the OKP plan in 2005.
According to these three examples, we obtain the dummy variables for
\select"and \win"presented in table 5.
Table 5: Examples of constructed variables select and win
Ms Poorly Ms Happy Mr Stressed
Year select win select win select win
2001 0 0 1 0 1 0
2002 0 0 1 0 1 0
2003 0 0 1 1 1 0
2004 0 0 1 1 1 1
2005 0 0 1 1 1 0
2006 0 0 1 1 1 0
These variables split the observations into three di®erent groups:
Select=0, Win=0 People who stayed in the OKP plan for the entire pe-
riod
Select=1, Win=0 People who opt for the Winwin plan for at least one
year but who are not in the Winwin plan that year
Select=1, Win=1 People choosing at least one year the Winwin plan and
who are in the Winwin plan that year
The selection e®ect can be identi¯ed by comparing the health expen-
ditures of the ¯rst two groups (in particular prior to selecting the Winwin
plan), while the e±ciency e®ect can be identi¯ed by comparing the health
expenditures of the last two groups (mainly after selecting the Winwin plan).Does telemedicine decrease costs or only attract good risks ? 13
5.2 Results
We shall present only the results of the main estimation, i.e. the two-
step model for adults who chose the OKP plan in 2001 and 2002. The
estimations for those already in the GP plan and for children are presented
in the Appendix. Table 6 presents the results of the two-step estimation.
The ¯rst step is a logistic estimation and the table 6 presents the results as
odds ratios 5, while the second step is a linear estimation.
Table 6: Two-step estimation of health expenditure
Logistic (N=875 292) OLS (N=706 245)
Odds Ratio z Coe±cient t
win 1.0292 1.49 -234.49 -3.72
select 0.8963 -10.50 -702.60 -21.65
age 1.0315 152.84 79.01 161.60
gender 0.4017 -152.46 -86.99 5.56
subvention 1.0178 2.05 767.05 32.89
ded low 0.6709 -52.56 -719.42 -35.62
ded mid 0.3054 -73.41 -1 512.14 -25.24
ded high 0.2663 -170.38 -1 724.94 -62.49
D2001 0.9023 -9.84 -1 121.29 -40.67
D2002 0.9538 -4.51 -968.15 -35.29
D2003 0.9779 -2.14 -766.05 -28.06
D2004 1.0318 2.99 -270.56 -9.96
D2005 1.0275 2.63 -163.64 -6.08
constant 44.19 1.16
...and dummies for canton
In both steps the \select"variable has a negative e®ect on health expendi-
ture, meaning that even when controlling for age, gender and deductible, the
remaining selection e®ects continue to be highly signi¯cant. The results show
that an [Select=1, Win=0] individual has an 11% lower chance of having a
positive expenditure and spends about Sfr 700 less on health care compared
to an [Select=0, Win=0] individual with the same age/gender/deductible.
5We present the odds ratios instead of the coe±cients of the associated logit model in
order to facilitate the interpretation of the results. We therefore expect the odds ratios
to be lower than one for negative logit coe±cients and higher than one for positive logit
coe±cients. The di®erence with respect to one can be directly interpreted as a % change
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This selection e®ect re°ects di®erences in health status across both plans.
The coe±cient of the variable \win"can be interpreted as the e±ciency
e®ect of the Winwin plan. The estimation shows that the probability of
having positive expenditures is not lowered by the Winwin plan. However,
the average amount spent by an individual with a positive expenditure is
reduced by more than Sfr 200 in the Winwin plan. Taking the two steps
together, we ¯nd that the Winwin plan has an average e±ciency e®ect of
Sfr 153 per individual per year. In Switzerland, this amount corresponds to
approximately two visits to a general practitioner or one visit to a specialist.
As expected, age has a positive e®ect on health expenditures and is
highly signi¯cant in both steps of the estimation. Men have a lower prob-
ability of having positive health expenditures. Even when this is the case,
they spend less than women. The subsidy variable is negatively related to in-
come and shows that individuals in receipt of a subsidy (low-income bracket)
spend more than individuals whose insurance premiums are not subsidised.
The deductible groups present the usual decreasing pattern with respect
to the deductible level. This, however, merges the three e®ects. The self-
selection of the deductible re°ecting good health, the incentive e®ect due to
the higher co-payment rate, and part of the selection e®ect of the Winwin
plan, since the deductible re°ects health status and selection of this plan
also depends on this factor. The exact amounts of these three e®ects can-
not be estimated, but the main purpose of these variables is to control for
the di®erence in incentives, which is exactly what we did. Finally, the time
dummies show a signi¯cant rise in the amount of care delivered over time.
The coe±cients of the cantonal variables are presented in the Appendix.
The e±ciency of the plan is estimated at SFr 153. Information on the
cost of the telemedicine service is con¯dential. However, the public price of
the telemedicine service for a whole family is valued at SFr 150 per year,
which is more than what is charged at the KPT, and logically is more than
the costs of the service. The inclusion of the telemedicine service has reduced
health spending costs and is cost-e®ective, in other words the health cost
reduction is greater than the costs of the service.
5.3 Who wins?
The overall e±ciency gain is estimated at Sfr 153. But who is actually saving
this money? If the gain is realized under the deductible level, the whole
amount will be saved by the insured. If this gain is realized above the cap,
only the insurer bene¯ts. If the gain is realized between the deductible level
and the cap, 90% goes to the insurer and 10% to the insured (correspondingDoes telemedicine decrease costs or only attract good risks ? 15
to the 10% co-payment after the deductible level is reached). We forecasted
the spending and the OoP (Out of Pocket payment) with the true data for
Winwin enrolees. We also forecasted the amount of spending and OoP they
would have had according to the model if they had stayed in the OKP plan.
Table 7 presents the distribution of the e±ciency gain between insured and
insurer.
Table 7: Distribution of the e±ciency gain between insured and insurer
Insurer Insured Total
Predicted gain 90 63 153
Percentage 59% 41% 100%
The amount saved by the insurer is still higher than the costs, which
means that the insurer has a net gain generated by the introduction of a
telemedicine service.
Without the telemedicine service there would have been a certain number
of physician visits (N), but since it is easier to phone the call centre than
to meet the physician face-to-face, the number of calls will be higher than
the number of medical visits (N+p). Furthermore, the calls may result in
a reduction in medical visits (N+p-r). Overall, the model shows a decrease
in medical visits, so that (r>p). The plan therefore saves futile physician
visits being made.
6 Conclusion
We have seen that the average health expenditures of the Winwin plan is
about Sfr 1 500 and represents half of the average health expenditures of
the OKP plan. 90% of this Sfr 1 500 di®erence can be attributed to self-
selection and incentive e®ects, while 10% can be explained by e±ciency (that
is approx. Sfr 150 of e±ciency gain per year). Moreover, the self-selection
e®ect is considerable, at least three times higher than the e±ciency e®ect,
if we take only the \pure" select e®ect. Given that this managed care plan
attracts many healthy individuals, a certain degree of risk selection does
occur through self-selection.
The introduction of a mandatory telemedicine service to a fee-for-service
plan reduces health costs and is cost-e®ective. The e±ciency e®ect is small
in comparison to the increase in costs through time. Consequently, thisDoes telemedicine decrease costs or only attract good risks ? 16
innovation may curb but certainly does not stop the increase of health ex-
penditures. However, according to our research which focused solely on
monetary gain, both the insured and the insurer bene¯t.
This plan also o®ers non-monetary gains. Firstly, the insured receive
better information since they make greater use of the telemedical service
than they would a physician and, secondly, they save on actual consulta-
tions. With each saved physician visit, the patient also saves on travel costs
and waiting times, not to mention lower anxiety levels due to the advice
dispensed by the health professionals at the telemedicine call centre. This
only bene¯ts the insured. The non-monetary cost of the plan is the time
of a phone call, and constitutes a pure loss if it is followed by a visit to a
physician. Good triage and time management may prevent or reduce some
inpatient stays in the long run, so much so that the state may also save on
public hospital subsidies (presently the state covers 50% of inpatient bills).
There is no clear evidence of such an e®ect in the data set, but we are
certainly not in the long run yet. The insurer is ¯nally not the ultimate
winner, even when its costs are covered. In fact, the insured bene¯t from
better information, save non-monetary and monetary costs, as well as enjoy
lower premiums.
Finally, the method proposed in this paper distinguishes between selection-
incentive and e±ciency e®ects and may be used to compare any managed
care plan.Does telemedicine decrease costs or only attract good risks ? 17
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7 Appendix
7.1 Results for the canton dummies - main estimation
Table 8 presents the coe±cients and t-test associated with the canton dum-
mies introduced as explanatory variables in the main two-step regressions.
The coe±cients adequately represent the levels of spending in each canton
directly linked to premium levels.
Table 8: Canton dummies for the main regression (reference: Bern)
Logistic estimation (N=875'292) OLS estimation (N=706'245)
Odds Ratio Std. Err. z Coe±cient Std. Err. t
AG 1.0125 0.0194 0.65 -150.41 54.42 -2.76
AI 0.6417 0.0672 -4.24 -1 211.68 323.61 -3.74
AR 0.6584 0.0250 -11.01 -888.97 110.15 -8.07
BL 1.3940 0.0294 15.74 13.91 54.51 0.26
BS 1.4207 0.0492 10.13 752.55 83.40 9.02
FR 1.6099 0.0243 31.57 -141.06 37.44 -3.77
GE 1.8368 0.0268 41.70 1 098.50 33.81 32.49
GL 0.9430 0.0594 -0.93 -959.98 171.99 -5.58
GR 1.3197 0.0214 17.13 -454.42 39.88 -11.40
JU 1.3839 0.0623 7.22 446.58 107.67 4.15
LU 0.8047 0.0134 -13.01 -530.90 50.04 -10.61
NE 1.3869 0.0629 7.21 881.19 91.26 9.66
NW 0.7631 0.0264 -7.83 -702.89 105.15 -6.68
OW 0.8400 0.0555 -2.64 -534.52 206.32 -2.59
SG 1.2208 0.0208 11.71 -616.92 45.43 -13.58
SH 1.0235 0.0500 0.48 -163.70 131.99 -1.24
SO 1.0184 0.0171 1.09 -361.93 48.30 -7.49
SZ 1.0620 0.0393 1.63 -527.12 104.04 -5.07
TG 0.9479 0.0278 -1.82 97.13 82.66 1.18
TI 1.6963 0.0175 51.22 353.35 26.56 13.30
UR 0.8337 0.0369 -4.11 -980.43 125.27 -7.83
VD 1.5873 0.0183 40.15 510.20 28.66 17.80
VS 1.3208 0.0203 18.11 -620.04 38.44 -16.13
ZG 0.8389 0.0286 -5.16 -325.97 105.38 -3.09
ZH 1.0570 0.0104 5.65 -112.67 28.17 -4.00Does telemedicine decrease costs or only attract good risks ? 20
7.2 Results for adult individuals choosing the GP plan in
2001-2002
The same model was estimated for adult individuals choosing the GP model
in 2001 or/and in 2002. In 2003, the Winwin plan replaced the GP plan;
some of the enrolees then chose the Winwin plan, while others preferred the
OKP plan. Since they selected a managed care plan in 2001 or/and 2002,
they already revealed some unobserved characteristics compared to those
who chose the OKP plan in 2001 and 2002. We expect therefore another
value for the coe±cient of the variable \select"with regard to the reference
estimation. Table 9 presents the results for the two variables of interest.
Table 9: Estimation for adults individuals in the GP plan in 2001/2002
Logistic estimation (N=93 474)
Prob(Y>0) Odds Ratio Std. Err. z
win 0.9236 0.0280 -2.63
select 0.7634 0.0187 -11.00
OLS estimation (N=71 741)
Y>0 Coe±cient Std. Err. t
win -106.47 80.44 -1.32
select -446.35 64.60 -6.91
If we regroup both steps of the estimation, we obtain an overall e±ciency
e®ect of Sfr 101 for the subpopulation who chose the GP plan in 2001 or/and
2002. This shows that those participating in the GP plan in the past already
had \better"health service consumption behaviour, so there was less to be
saved. Again one can distribute this e±ciency gain between the insured and
the insurer. Using the predicted costs, we obtain a Sfr 68 (67%) gain for the
insurer and the remaining Sfr 33 (33%) gain for the insured.
7.3 Results for children
We now regress on the children sub-sample (for those who chose the OKP
plan in 2001 and 2002). We suspect that the selection e®ect is smaller than
for adults, since generally the whole family selects the Winwin plan, and
greater weight is probably given to the health status of the parents when
deciding to opt for the Winwin plan or not. Table 10 presents the results
for the two main variables for the children estimation.Does telemedicine decrease costs or only attract good risks ? 21
Table 10: Estimation of the two-step model for children
Logistic estimation (N=207 420)
Prob(Y>0) Odds Ratio Std. Err. z
win 0.8989 0.0293 -3.27
select 0.9230 0.0183 -4.04
OLS estimation (N=167 789)
Y>0 Coe±cient Std. Err. t
win -73.60 40.60 -1.81
select -176.24 22.58 -7.81
Average expenditure levels are much lower for children than for adults.
Furthermore, since the age and gender e®ect are also di®erent, their exclu-
sion from the \general"sample was justi¯ed. We obtain an overall signi¯-
cant e±ciency e®ect of Sfr 68, which corresponds to about 12% of average
expenditure in the Winwin plan. However, since most of the children had no
deductible at all (the basic deductible level for children is zero), the insurer
bene¯ted much more from the gain (82%) than the insured (18%). The se-
lection e®ect is indeed lower, about 2.3 times the e±ciency e®ect (but three
times for adult individuals). 